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Abstract: While local legislatures generally have broad authority to enact land 
use regulations that serve a public interest, the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act as well as constitutional limits found in the First 
Amendment limit religious land use regulations that seek to restrict religious 
freedom.  This article explores the Second Circuit’s decision in Westchester Day 
School v. Village of Mamaroneck, and makes suggestions about the future 




In previous columns, we have examined the great deference that the 
courts show in reviewing the land use decisions of local boards as they review 
and approve development projects.  When the projects are advanced by religious 
organizations, both the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and federal 
religious liberty statutes place courts in a different, less deferential posture.  In 
these cases, a denial impinges on a religious institution and the courts look more 
closely at the rational for the local land use board’s decision.  This column 
explores the extent to which local boards are constrained in their decision-
making when a religious land use is involved.  
 
The most recent federal enactment affecting land use decisions involving 
religious institutions is the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”) which was implicated in a recent decision of the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals.  Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, No. 03-9042, 2004 
U.S. App. LEXIS 20327 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2004).  Attorneys for municipalities, 
religious entities, and neighborhood groups are keenly interested in the extent to 
which RLUIPA alters the normally generous attitude of the courts in reviewing 
land use decisions.  The district court opinion in this case had granted the 
Westchester Day School’s motion for summary judgment and ordered the 
issuance of a special use permit modification.  This seemingly changed 
significantly the standards by which land use decisions are measured when a 
religious use is involved.  The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
summary judgment award, moderated the standards applied to the decision of 
the Zoning Board of Appeals, and remanded the matter for further fact finding 




In October 2001, Westchester Day School (“WDS”) submitted an 
application for modification of its special permit to allow construction of a new 
classroom building and renovation of two existing buildings to accommodate its 
student population.  WDS offers a “coeducational curriculum of secular and 
Judaic studies, daily prayer, and observance of Jewish practices and customs.”  
Westchester Day Sch., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 20327, at *5.  The plan involved 
mainly the construction or renovation of facilities used for secular activities, such 
as classrooms for music, art, and computers.  WDS also intended to build and 
modify facilities for a Jewish library and new chapel intended specifically for 
religious exercise.  
 
After several months of public hearings and collecting comments from 
professionals, the Zoning Board of Appeals (“the Board”), the board responsible 
for issuing the permit modification, voted 3-2 to adopt a resolution denying 
WDS’s application.  “Among [the] reasons cited by the Board for denying the 
permit were: the potential for increased intensity of use due to increased 
enrollment at WDS; traffic concerns relating to increased volume and the effect 
on nearby intersections; and insufficient provision for parking.”  Id. at *7.  
 
WDS sued the Village claiming that the denial constituted a substantial 
burden of its religious freedom in violation RLUIPA.  The district court found that 
the Village’s complete denial of the special permit modification was a violation of 
RLUIPA and granted summary judgment in favor of WDS and ordered the 
immediate and unconditional approval of the application.  Westchester Day Sch. 
v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment, 
concluding that the evidence on the record did not compel judgment in WDS’s 
favor.  Westchester Day Sch., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 20327, at *4-*5.  “[T]he 
[district] court’s judgment depended on findings of fact upon which a factfinder 




 RLUIPA prevents federal, state, and local governments from “impos[ing] 
or implement[ing] a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial 
burden on … religious exercise.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).  The claimant 
bears the burden of persuasion and must demonstrate that the law (including a 
regulation) or government practice that is challenged (1) imposes a substantial 
burden; (2) on the “religious exercise”; (3) of a person, institute or assembly.  
“Religious exercise” is defined by the statute as “any exercise of religion, whether 
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  § 2000cc-5(7)(A).  
“The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious 
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise.”  § 2000cc-5(7)(B).  If a 
prima facie case is established, the government must demonstrate that its 
regulation furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and is the “least 
restrictive measure of furthering that interest.”  § 2000cc(a)(1).   
 
According to the Second Circuit, the district court had determined that the 
Board’s “complete denial” of WDS’s plans constituted a “substantial burden on 
religious exercise” because “religious exercise … was at stake in all aspects of 
the proposed plan.”  Westchester Day Sch., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 20327, at *9-
*10.  The court found that the Board failed to establish a “compelling government 




 The district court stressed that the Board’s decision was a “complete 
denial” of WDS’s proposed plan which the Second Circuit interpreted to “imply a 
finding that the denial conclusively rejected the school’s plans, leaving open no 
possibility that the Board might be amenable to the resubmission of a modified 
application, addressing the problems the Board cited.”  Id. at *12.  According to 
the Second Circuit, a fact finder could have found otherwise.  On its face, the 
Board’s resolution suggests that a modified plan that cures the problems and 
deficiencies cited by the Board might be approved.  Quoting language from the 
Zoning Board’s resolution explaining its denial of the project as submitted, the 
Second Circuit determined that WDS could modify its plans for the secular 
facilities to mitigate traffic and parking impacts and provide the Board with the 
information it requested so that the Board might approve the application.  
  
If the Board’s decision was not a complete denial and left open the 
possibility of approval of a modified plan, then it is less likely to constitute a 
“substantial burden.”  Nothing in the record compels the finding of a complete 
denial, so whether the Board’s ruling constituted a complete denial was a fact to 
be determined by a fact finder.  The court concluded that “the finding of a 
complete denial was essential to the court’s finding of ‘substantial burden,’ that 
reason alone would compel [the court] to vacate the grant of summary judgment.”  
Id.   
 
Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise 
 
In dicta, the Second Circuit expressed concerns with the district court’s 
broad application of RLUIPA protection.  The district court found the WDS’s 
entire plan to be “religious exercise” because WDS “delivers a secular and 
religious education in a religious environment,” so any improvement to the 
school’s facilities that improves the students’ educational experience is protected 
by RLUIPA.  Id. at *17.  “According to this logic, any improvement or enlargement 
proposed by a religious school to its secular educational and accessory facilities 
would be immune from regulation or rejection by a zoning board so long as the 
proposed improvement would enhance the overall experience of the students.”  
Id. at *17.  Such a determination raises serious constitutional issues.   
 
As a legislative accommodation of religion, RLUIPA occupies a treacherous 
narrow zone between the Free Exercise Clause, which seeks to assure that 
government does not interfere with the exercise of religion, and the 
Establishment Clause, which prohibits the government from becoming entwined 
with religion in a manner that would express preference for one religion over 
another, or religion over irreligion.  Id. at *18.  According to the Second Circuit, if 
the district court’s interpretation of RLUIPA is applied, it raises serious questions 
about whether the statute “goes beyond the proper function of protecting the free 
exercise of religion into the constitutionally impermissible zone of entwining 
government with religion.”  Id. at *19 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 537 (1997)  (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 
Compelling Governmental Interest 
 
 The district court, found that the Board’s denial of the permit was not 
justified by compelling governmental interests. The Second Circuit disagreed 
holding that for summary judgment purposes this finding was not compelled by 
the record and that the matter should have been submitted for further 
proceedings for findings of fact on these issues.   
 
The district court looked at three aspects of the Board’s decision and, in 
each case, found that no compelling interest was involved.  The first of these was 
traffic impact.  The district court asserted that “‘traffic concerns have never been 
deemed compelling government interests.’”  Id. at *21-*22 (quoting Westchester 
Day Sch., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 242). The Second Circuit found that the district 
court should have exercised “judicial restraint” and there was no need for the 
court to “establish [such] a far-reaching constitutional rule.”  Id. at *23.  The court 
found no compelling authority for such a rule.   
  
Second, the district court was not convinced that the Board’s traffic 
experts proved that the lack of sufficient parking spaces would cause an 
immediate threat to the public health or safety.  Third, the district court found that 
the Board did not act in good faith, “but that its ‘abrupt reversal of its prior 
approval … was a reaction to belated public outcry, a paradigm of what has been 
referred to as the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome.’”  Id. at *24 (quoting 
Westchester Day Scool, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 243).  Regarding both of these 
findings, the Second Circuit determined that the district court failed to establish 
that “no reasonable trier of fact could, upon the record presented, find otherwise.”  




 The Westchester Day School case illustrates how courts could 
misconstrue RLUIPA to give religious land uses, including their secular as well as 
spiritual facilities, a greater preference over proposals submitted by purely 
secular institutions raising Establishment Clause concerns.  Such an 
interpretation of the statute would be suspect if it favored, in the Second Circuit’s 
words, religious over irreligious land uses.  This could be the result if RLUIPA is 
too broadly interpreted and fact-based denials or conditions are routinely 
overturned unless there is evidence that they are motivated by discriminatory 
intentions.  A denial based on traditional land use impact analyses is not 
necessarily a violation of RLUIPA, particularly where the nature of the denial 
leaves room for the religious institution to modify its proposal to mitigate adverse 
impacts and secure approval.   
 
When RLUIPA was adopted, Congress found that “[c]hurches in general, 
and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are frequently discriminated 
against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly individualized and 
discretionary processes of land use regulation.”  Congress found that recent 
trends in the manner that Americans worship have resulted in increased disputes 
over the application of local zoning ordinances to religious uses of property.   
 
RLUIPA requires local governments to implement land use regulations in 
a manner that treats religious assembly or institutions on equal terms, is 
nondiscriminatory, and does not exclude or unreasonably limit religious assembly 
within a jurisdiction.  Religious land uses can cause heavy traffic, overflow 
parking, noisy assemblages, radiating light from cars and poles, visual 
disturbances, stormwater runoff, soil erosion and sedimentation, flooding, and a 
host of other typical off-site impacts.  The Second Circuit decision appears to 
leave land use boards free to examine those impacts, require their mitigation, 
deny projects where their religious sponsors are not forthcoming with reasonable 
changes, and otherwise act as land use bodies are charged to act in the public 
interest.   
 
Judicial decisions in New York that preexisted RLUIPA made it clear that 
religious land uses advance the public welfare and the courts have consistently 
held that religious uses of property, and a wide variety of accessory uses, are in 
the public interest.  Absent clear evidence to the contrary, such land uses must 
be accommodated by land use regulations and permitting agencies.  RLUIPA 
adds to this historical protection by increasing the burden on land use boards to 
show the public interests to be protected by land use conditions and denials 
where the religious institution can make out a prima facie case of religious 
discrimination.  Neither the common law nor the statutory protection, however, 
strip land use decision makers of the authority to ensure that religious land uses 
mitigate their adverse impacts and take into account surrounding conditions 
when proposing new or expanded facilities. 
 
Curiously, decisions like the Second Circuit’s may save RLUIPA from 
charges that it is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.  To the extent 
that reasonable, fact-based conditions imposed on religious land uses are 
upheld, RLUIPA avoids the charge that it causes privileges to flow directly to 
religious landowners solely because of their religious character.  To the extent 
that RLUIPA is used to cause local land use boards to become deeply entangled 
in religious considerations, rather than land use impact consideration, it runs 
further risk of being declared unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.   
 
  
 
 
